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Abstract 
This study focus on the relationship between crime and business cycle in Argentina, at 
national and provincial level, using monthly time series for the period 1999-2008. For that 
end we examine the presence of common factors (interpreted as cyclical components) 
driving the dynamics of a set of types of crimes and monthly economic activity indicators 
(EMAE and ISAP). By means of Dynamic Factor Models we identify which type of crime is 
related to business cycle and if these crimes are leading, lagging or coincident. We find a 
strong counter-cyclical relationship between total and property crime rates and its 
typologies and business cycle. Additionally these series are slightly lagged with respect to 
business cycle. On the other hand, crimes against persons are found to be pro-cyclical 
and coincident. 
 
Resumen 
Este trabajo intenta captar la relación entre crimen y ciclos económicos en Argentina, 
tanto a nivel nacional como provincial, utilizando series mensuales para el período 1999-
2008. Para ello se analiza la presencia de factores comunes (interpretados como 
componentes cíclicos) que conducen la dinámica de un conjunto de crímenes y de 
indicadores mensuales de actividad (EMAE e ISAP). Utilizando los Modelos de Factores 
Dinámicos (DFM) identificamos cuáles crímenes se relacionan con el ciclo económico y 
si esos crímenes son líderes, coincidentes o rezagadas en relación al ciclo económico. 
Encontramos una fuerte relación contra-cíclica entre los crímenes totales y contra la 
propiedad y el ciclo económico. Adicionalmente estas series son levemente rezagadas 
con respecto al ciclo. Por otro lado, los crímenes contra las personas son pro-cíclicos y 
coincidentes.  
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I.  Introduction 
 
Since the seminal work by Becker (1968) that provided the first economic theory of crime, 
many works have been devoted to the study of criminal behavior. According to Becker 
criminals are rational agents who maximize their utilities dividing their time between legal and 
illegal activities. This decision comes from a maximization problem in which agents compare 
expected costs and benefits of legal and illegal activities taking into accounts the probability 
of being arrested and punished. 
Theoretical literature of crime emphasizes on two fundamental aspects: the deterrence effect, 
related to the probability of being arrested and of being condemned and the social and 
macroeconomic effect of environment which generates an atmosphere prone to crime, 
measured by variables such as the unemployment rate, income per capita, income growth, 
inequality in income distribution, education, among others. 
The relationship between economic activity and the crime rate is controversial: An economic 
expansion could reduce criminal activities but it could also make illegal activities more 
attractive since it presents better opportunities, although, the potential victims could 
neutralize this "richness" effect by destining more resources against crime (alarms, bars, 
etc.).  
As discussed in Cantor and Land (1985) there are two different types of effect: motivation 
effect and opportunity effect. The first one refers to the incentive to commit crime based on 
bad economic conditions. Hence, during recessions, individuals increase crime participation 
in order to increase their incomes. The second one works in the opposite way: the 
opportunities to commit crime increase along with the economic performance. However the 
impact of opportunity and motivational effect can be different depending on the crime 
typology under study. For instance, property crimes can be more affected by motivation 
effects that imply a negative correlation with the economic fluctuations. 
This paper tries to shed light on the relationship between economic activity and crime rate for 
Argentinean Provinces using monthly time series for the period 1999.1-2008.12. We will try to 
identify common factors between Economic Indicators of Activity (EMAE and ISAP) and a set 
of types of crime by means of Dynamic Factor Models. Additionally we will try to determine if 
these types of crime are leading, lagging or coincident with EMAE and ISAP. We are not 
aware of any study using this method for Argentina, and very few for other countries for 
example the paper of Detotto and Otranto (2011) for Italy. 
The structure of this paper is as follows: After the introduction, Section II presents the 
theoretical and empirical evidence; Section III shows the Dynamic Factor Model. Section IV 
presents an overview of data. Section V outlines the empirical model and discusses the 
econometric results. Section VI concludes. 
 
II. Theoretical and empirical evidence 
 
Theoretical models of crime surge as an extension of Becker seminal paper (1968). 
According to Becker, criminal behaviour is a decision of rational agents who maximize their 
utilities by comparing the expected costs and benefits of legal and illegal activities. Agents 
will engage criminal activities if  
)()()1()( iLiiILiiiiILii IUYUpCYUp >−+−
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Where p is the probability of conviction, UIL is the utility derived from illegal activities, Y is the 
income from illegal activities, while C are the costs associated to illegal activities. It includes 
direct costs of criminal justice system, as well as the opportunity cost of foregone legal 
activities. On the other hand UL is the utility of legal activities, and I is the income from legal 
activities.  
In the last decades a vast literature devoted to test the economic model of crime surged, 
trying to estimate the effect of economic variables (economic growth, unemployment, income 
inequality) on the crime rate.  
The general assumption is that economic fluctuations affect criminal rate by changing the 
expected income and cost derived from legal to illegal activities. During expansions 
(recessions) the income of legal activities increases (decreases), but also the opportunities 
available to criminal activities. The impact of these conflicting effects will depend on the type 
of crime. Empirical investigations support that the relationship between crime and economic 
activity mostly depends on the type of crime. For example property crimes are found to be 
counter-cyclical, while crimes against persons are not as sensitive to economic variations. 
One of the first empirical papers linking crime to business cycle was due to Phelps (1929). 
Phelps correlated an own constructed index of crime to an index of economic conditions. He 
extracted the secular trend of both indexes and find a negative correlation between them, 
meaning that crimes increase with poverty and decrease with prosperity. He also compares 
the movements in different types of crime with an index of economic conditions, finding that 
property crime is more related to economic conditions. 
Later Short (1951) investigates on the relationship between business cycle and crime, 
specifically robbery and burglary for the US, finding a negative correlation between them, 
mainly in short cycles. He also finds that in larger cities crime has higher correlations with 
business cycles than it does in smaller cities. 
Cantor and Land (1985), Cook and Zarkin (1985), Corman and Lovitch (1987) and  Arvanities 
and Delfina (2006), using a VAR model find that property crime is counter-cyclical while 
crimes against persons are not very sensitive to economic fluctuations. The authors detect a 
motivational and opportunity effect. The motivational effect works in the long-run since ”those 
recently unemployed have a stock of resources that they can use before feeling the effect of 
unemployment, while the opportunity effect works in the short run because the movements in 
the employment rate quickly impact the circulation of people and goods, affecting the attitude 
towards crime”. Arvanities and Delfina (2006) examine the influence of business cycle 
fluctuations on street crime in the conceptual framework of Cantor and Land’s paper. In a 
panel study, they show that an improvement in economic conditions reduce property crimes. 
Cook and Zarkin (1985) set that economic fluctuations affect crime in different ways 
depending on the typology of crime. Burglary and theft are found to be counter-cyclical, auto 
theft pro-cyclical, while cycle has no effect on homicides.  
Other studies aim at identifying the short and long run effect of the economic fluctuations on 
crime rate for different typologies of crime. Pyle and Deadman (1994) for the post war 
England and Wales period, find a long-run relationship between economic fluctuations 
(consumption, GDP and unemployment) and crime (burglary, theft and robbery). In addition, 
Hale (1999) finds a short and long run effect on property crime while unemployment has only 
a short run effect. 
Garret and Ott (2008) in a monthly time series analysis explore the influence of business 
cycle fluctuations on crime in 20 large cities in the US. They consider seven different types of 
crimes, concluding that short-run changes in economic conditions, as measured by changes 
in unemployment and wages, are found to have little effect on city crime across many cities. 
Property crimes were more likely to be influenced by changes in economic conditions than 
were more violent crimes. They also find strong evidence that in many cities more arrests 
follow from an increase in crime rather than arrests leading to a decrease in crime. This is 
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true especially for the more visible crimes of robbery and vehicle theft and suggests that city 
officials desire to remove these crimes from the public's view.  
In line with the present research is the paper of Detotto and Otranto (2011) for Italy. They try 
to detect the relationships between different typologies of crime and GDP by means of 
Dynamic Factor Models and whether these crimes are leading, coincident or lagging series. 
They find that most of the crimes show a counter-cyclical behavior with respect to GDP, i.e., 
a rise in the economic performance is associated with a decrease in total crime rate. Even 
more, some property crimes, such as bankruptcy, fraudulent insolvency and embezzlement 
seem to anticipate the business cycle. 
 
III. The Dynamic Factor Model Approach 
 
The purpose of Factor Model is to extract the common factor from the full set of variables 
under study. The idea is that each variable can be decomposed into a common part (non- 
observable factor) and an idiosyncratic noise. The unobserved factors and the disturbances 
in the equations for the observed variables may follow vector autoregressive structures. 
Additionally it is possible to classify the series as leading, coincident or lagging with respect 
to a reference series.1  
Following Forni et al (2000) and Detotto and Otranto (2011), we consider a vector de n 
second-order stationary observed variables, zt (in this case crime rate and its typologies and 
GDP), with q orthogonal common factors contained in the vector yt of unobservable common 
factors. Vector zt is a multivariate time series that can be decomposed as follows: 
t
q
ttz ςχ +=             (1) 
where ζt  is the nx1 vector of idiosyncratic components and  the common part χq is a linear 
projection de zt on the space generated by yt: 
tq
q
t yLC )(=χ           (2) 
The vector χq  can be estimated by dynamic principal components as proposed by Forni et al 
(2000). Given the orthogonality condition between χq and ζt  , the spectral density matrix of zt, 
can be decomposed into the spectral density matrices of χq  and ζt  respectively 
∑ ∑∑ +=
q
χ ς ωωω )()()(          (3) 
Forni et al (2000) show that a consistent estimator of χq is obtained as a projection of zt on 
the first q eigenvectors of spectral density matrix, associated with the first q eigenvalues in 
descending order.  
We compute the spectral density matrix at different frequencies ω, then we compute the first 
q eigenvalues and eigenvectors for each Σ(ω) , combining them to obtain the estimation of yt 
and Cq(L).  In this way the common components χq are obtained as a linear combination of 
lagged, coincident and leading factors yt. For example, if we identify 2 factors, we can write 
the common component χq  as: 
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1
 Dynamic-factor models have been developed and applied in macroeconomics; see Geweke (1977), Sargent and 
Sims (1977), Stock and Watson (1989, 1991), and Watson and Engle (1983). 
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Where χq is the cyclical component of the variable j, c are weights for the variable j Notice 
that static principal component is a particular case when m=0. 
The estimation of the model (1) implies the estimation of q factors. A practical solution is to 
choose q factors such that they explain a large proportion of the series variance, typically it 
would be between 50 to 70%.  
As we said before, this procedure allows as to classify the series (crime rates) as leading, 
coincident and lagging with respect to a reference series; in this case, to EMAE and ISAP. 
We have to extract their cyclical component, contained in the vector χq and to compare all the 
other elements of this vector, each one representing the cyclical components of each crime 
types with EMAE and ISAP, with it. Then we have to calculate the mean delay which 
measures the lags in the movements of a series with respect to another one. If the mean 
delay between the crime series and the EMAE or ISAP is equal to 3, it means that the crimes 
series leads the economic activity by three periods. 
Importantly, DFM captures the common movements of the series contained in zt without 
analyzing some cause-effect relationships among variables. 
The parameters of dynamic-factor models may be estimated by maximum likelihood. The ML 
estimator is implemented by writing the model in state-space form and by using the Kalman 
filter to derive and implement the log likelihood. 
 
IV. Data 
 
The dataset used in this paper consists on monthly observations running from 1999:01 to 
2008:12. Crime Data was collected from Registro Nacional de Reincidencia Criminal. Crime 
rates were defined as the number of reported offences per 10,000 inhabitants. We include 
total crime rate, property crime rate, distinguishing between robbery, theft and other property 
crimes, and crimes against persons, including murders at national level. At provincial level we 
can only classify crimes as crimes against persons and property crimes. 
Table 1. Classification of Crime Typology 
Crime Group Typology Nomenclature 
Total Crime  HDEL 
Property Crime  DCPRO 
 Robbery ROBT 
 Theft HURT 
Crime Against Person  DCPER 
 Murder HOMD 
 Intentional Injury LESD 
 
We approach the national economic activity by the EMAE (Monthly Estimator of National 
Economic Activity, 1993=100) elaborated by INDEC. This indicator is a good GDP proxy at 
monthly level.  
At provincial level we use as an economic activity indicator a quarterly coincident index ISAP 
constructed by Muñoz y Asociados. In order to change the periodicity of the index and 
transform it in a monthly series, we repeat each observation of the quarterly series three 
times. For example, the first quarterly observation of each year is repeated for January, 
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February and March of that year. We proceed like this, since the quarterly observation is 
centered in the middle of the corresponding quarter (in this case February). After that we 
smooth the resulting monthly series by means of X12 ARIMA. 
Table 2 shows a summary statistics of national crime rate series and EMAE. Property Crime 
Rate represents 63.7% of total crimes in the period 2000-2008, and it is by far the largest 
group.  Among property crimes, robberies represent 49.6%, while thefts 40.8%. The second 
group in importance is crimes against person, with a participation of 19.4%. In this group, 
intentional injuries have a participation of 55.5%, while murders have a share of 1%. However 
this group is often studied separately, since it comprises the most sounded cases for its 
severity. 
 
Table 2. Crime Rate and EMAE Summary Statistics. Argentina 
 
Serie Period Obs HDEL
% 
Share by 
Type %* 
Mean Median SD Min Max SD/Mean 
HDEL 1999-2008 120 100.0  276 274 20 241 329 0.07 
DCPER 1999-2009 120 19.4 100.0 54 53 7 39 71 0.13 
HOMD 2000-2008 112 0.2 1.0 1 1 0 0 1 0.25 
LESD 2000-2009 112 10.7 55.1 30 29 4 19 39 0.14 
DCPRO 1999-2008 120 63.7 100.0 175 172 21 143 229 0.12 
ROBT 1999-2008 120 31.6 49.6 87 84 11 72 116 0.13 
HURT 2000-2008 112 25.5 40.8 70 70 10 53 95 0.15 
           
EMAE 1999-2008 120   126 121 22 87 174 0.17 
Source: Authors’ elaboration based on data collected from Registro Nacional de Reincidencia Criminal. Minesterio 
de Justicia de la Nación e INDEC 
Note: %HDEL: Participation in Total Crime (%) 
SD: Standar Deviation 
* Typologies share do not sum 100, since there are other types of crimes we did not include. 
 
In Table 3 we see the summary statistics at provincial level (see Figure 1A in Appendix). The 
participation of each province in the total crime looks similar to their participation in national 
GDP: Buenos Aires, Ciudad Autónoma, Córdoba, Mendoza, Santa Fe and Tucumán 
represents 70% of total crime just as GDP does. Mean, Median and SD refer to summary 
statistics of crime rates in the period 1999-2008. It is interested to note the heterogeneous 
behavior of crime rates in different provinces. For example, Ciudad Autónoma registers the 
highest rate with a value of 70.1 while Entre Ríos has the lowest one with 22.2 crimes per 
10000 inhabitants (see column Max). 
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Table 3. Total Crime Rate at Provincial Level. Summary Statistics 1999.1-2008.12 
Province Abrev Share Mean Median SD Min Max SD/M
ean 
Buenos Aires BUA 23.9% 16.3 16.6 2.9 12.1 22.8 0.17 
Catamarca CAT 1.2% 31.8 32.0 7.1 23.4 50.4 0.22 
Chaco  CHA 2.9% 27.9 27.7 6.3 20.0 44.7 0.23 
Chubut CHU 1.1% 23.4 26.0 4.2 15.4 35.6 0.18 
Ciudad Autónoma CAB 16.6% 57.5 58.8 4.3 48.5 70.1 0.08 
Córdoba CBA 10.6% 32.0 33.8 3.0 27.5 40.5 0.09 
Corrientes COR 2.2% 21.9 22.4 3.5 15.5 32.8 0.16 
Entre Ríos ERS 2.1% 17.0 17.6 1.8 13.9 22.2 0.10 
Formosa FOR 1.0% 19.4 19.6 3.4 14.1 28.6 0.17 
Jujuy JUJ 1.9% 25.6 29.7 9.6 5.5 65.0 0.37 
La Pampa LPP 1.0% 29.0 30.3 5.8 20.5 48.3 0.20 
La Rioja LRJ 0.6% 19.7 19.0 3.8 12.0 28.3 0.19 
Mendoza MEN 7.8% 41.8 47.4 3.3 42.5 58.3 0.08 
Misiones MIS 1.8% 16.3 17.5 3.0 11.3 25.9 0.19 
Neuquén NEU 2.5% 46.4 49.9 5.0 37.8 63.7 0.11 
Río Negro RNG 1.6% 25.5 26.5 4.4 16.3 39.7 0.17 
Salta SAL 3.7% 27.9 28.4 9.1 17.8 53.2 0.33 
San Juan SJU 2.2% 33.0 32.8 6.5 19.2 57.8 0.20 
San Luis SLU 0.8% 18.6 19.1 3.6 12.0 29.6 0.19 
Santa Cruz SCZ 0.8% 39.1 40.0 6.7 23.0 54.0 0.17 
Santa Fe SFE 8.8% 26.7 28.6 4.1 19.6 36.4 0.15 
Santiago del Estero SGO 1.6% 19.0 18.8 3.0 14.2 29.5 0.16 
Tierra del Fuego TDF 0.3% 27.1 29.5 4.2 18.6 38.2 0.16 
Tucumán TUC 2.8% 20.3 20.3 3.1 13.3 27.1 0.15 
Argentina  ARG 100% 27.2 27.2 1.8 22.3 32.4 0.07 
Source: Authors’ elaboration based on data collected from Registro Nacional de Reincidencia Criminal. 
Minesterio de Justicia de la Nación. 
Note: Share %: Participation in Total Crime (%) 
SD: Standard Deviation 
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Table 4 Correlations between Crime Rates and EMAE- Trend-Cycle components Argentina  
  
HDEL DCPER HOMD LESD DCPRO HURT ROBT EMAE 
HDEL 1.00 -0.12 0.63 0.37 0.89 0.84 0.92 -0.54 
DCPER 
 1.00 -0.73 0.69 -0.56 -0.62 -0.44 0.84 
HOMD 
  1.00 -0.41 0.87 0.83 0.84 -0.81 
LESD 
   1.00 -0.01 0.01 0.01 0.23 
DCPRO 
    1.00 0.98 0.97 -0.83 
HURT 
     1.00 0.91 -0.90 
ROBT       1.00 -0.70 
EMAE 
 
 
  
 
  
1.00 
 
 
In Table 4 we present the simple correlations between crime rate and its typologies and 
EMAE. We first see a high positive relationship between crimes against persons (DCPER) 
and EMAE of 0.84. This correlation is also positive but low (0.23) for intentional injury (LESD) 
while murders present a high negative correlation (-0.81). The correlation for property crimes 
is negative and high (-0.83) and also for theft (-0.9) and robberies (-0.7) 
Figure 1 shows a scatter plot of the national economic activity growth cycle and crime rates 
growth cycle for total crime, and its typologies. In order to obtain the cyclical component of 
the series, we used Hodrick and Prescott filter at the predetermined level of the parameter. 
We can clearly see a negative relationship between the cyclical component of total crime, 
property crime and its typologies and of the EMAE. For crimes against persons and its 
typologies, there is not such clear relationship, in the case of murders, the relationship looks 
negative. These results are consistent to the ones presented in Table 4. (At provincial level 
see Figure 2A in Appendix) 
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Figure 1. Scatter Plot – Crime Rates and EMAE 
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Empirical Results 
 
We seasonally adjusted all the series by means of the X12 ARIMA routine. Next, we 
transformed these series into logarithms and detrended them using the Hodrick and Prescott 
filter. Then, we tested for stationary to the resulting series, since the DF modes requires 
stationary series. Using the Phillips and Perron (1988) test, we could not reject stationarity at 
a significance level of 5%. 
After that, we extracted the common part of the series, and classified them according to their 
temporal relationship with the reference series, in this way we could determine if crime rates 
are coincident, leading or lagging respect to the EMAE at national level and to the ISAP at 
provincial level. 
 
V.I National Level 
Bivariate Model: Total Crime and EMAE 
We first specify a DFM with n=2 (n represents the number of series), and we set the 
minimum explained variance at 50%. In this way, the number of factors chosen is 1.  
 
Table 5: Correlation between common parts of total crime and EMAE.  
 
  (*)Lags 
  -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 
EMAE 0.045 0.097 0.442 0.586 0.765 1.000 0.765 0.586 0.442 0.097 0.045 
HDEL -0.09 -0.34 -0.43 -0.68 -0.75 -0.46 -0.44 -0.36 -0.09 -0.01 0.086 
 
According to Table 5 the correlation between total crime and EMAE is negative; indicating 
that total crime is counter-cyclical. Additionally, as the maximum correlation is in lag (-1), 
crime is lagged related to the reference cycle. This behavior seems to be in line with the 
theory of the motivation effect (Cantor and Land 1985), meaning that during recessions, 
individuals increase crime participation in order to increase their incomes. 
In addition, Table 6 shows that the variance explained by the common component is 74.5%, 
meaning that total crime rate has a significant common component with EMAE. 
Table 6: Ratio common component variance over series variance 
Series  Ratio Value 
EMAE 0.626 
HDEL 0.745 
 
Model 3-variate: Crime against persons, Property Crime and GDP  
Next we repeat the analysis performed in the previous section but with the two groups of 
crime considered: crimes against persons and property crimes rates.  
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We specify a DFM with n=3, and by setting the minimum explained variance at 50% we 
choose the number of factors, equal to 1  
 
Table 7: Correlation between common parts of Crimes against persons, Property crimes and 
EMAE.  
Series  (*)Lags 
 
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 
EMAE -0.12 0.04 0.30 0.61 0.88 1.00 0.88 0.61 0.30 0.04 -0.12 
DCPER 0.04 0.04 -0.03 -0.06 0.09 0.22 0.15 -0.03 0.03 0.00 0.00 
DCPRO 0.15 -0.07 -0.43 -0.72 -0.82 -0.77 -0.70 -0.51 -0.23 0.03 0.17 
 
Table 7 shows that the correlation between crime against persons and EMAE is positive, 
indicating that is pro-cyclical. Additionally, crime against persons is a coincident series since 
the maximum correlation is in lag (0), this behavior is consistent with the mean delay 
classification. On the other hand property crime is counter-cyclical and slightly lagged, which 
is again consistent with the mean delay classification. The negative correlation in property 
crime may be well explaining the negative correlation observed in total crime, given the high 
participation that property crime has on total crime (see Table 2). Table 8 shows that the 
variance explained by the common component is 60% for crimes against persons and 44% 
for property crime. 
 
 
Table 8: Ratio common component variance over series variance 
 
Series  Ratio 
Value 
EMAE 0.551 
DCPER 0.603 
DCPRO 0.442 
 
Model 5-variate: Murders, Intentional Injuries, Robbery, Thefts and EMAE 
 
We focus on the analysis of four crime variables along with the EMAE. We specify a DFM 
with n=5, and select factors so that they explain at least 50% of the total variance. We then 
choose the number of factors that is again equal to 1. 
Table 9 illustrates that theft and robberies behave counter-cyclically and slightly lagged with 
reference to business cycle, just as property crimes do. This behavior is in coincidence with 
the mean delay classification (Column 6 of Table 10). 
Among crimes against persons, murders are counter-cyclical and coincident, while intentional 
injuries are pro-cyclical and slightly lagged. The behavior of these series is not consistent 
with the mean delay classification, by which murders are slightly leading and intentional 
injured is coincident (Column 6 of Table 10) 
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Table 9: Correlation between common parts of Murders, Intentional Injuries, Robbery, Thefts 
and EMAE. Argentina 
 
Series  (*)Lags 
 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 
EMAE -0.02 0.03 0.17 0.45 0.79 1.00 0.79 0.45 0.17 0.03 -0.02 
HOMD -0.02 -0.03 -0.05 -0.06 -0.03 -0.35 -0.26 -0.11 -0.01 0.01 0.01 
LESD -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 0.07 0.28 0.22 0.23 0.05 0.02 0.05 -0.01 
ROBT 0.02 0.05 -0.16 -0.42 -0.53 -0.53 -0.48 -0.26 -0.09 -0.03 -0.03 
HURT 0.01 0.02 -0.16 -0.40 -0.47 -0.34 -0.28 -0.12 -0.04 -0.01 -0.02 
  
In column 4 of Table 10 shows that the variance explained by the common component for the 
four typologies of crimes have significant common component with EMAE, since their values 
are higher than 50%. 
Table 10: Analysis of the Common Parts of Crime typologies and EMAE 
Series Common 
parts 
Lags(1) RCCV(2) Phase 
classification(3) 
Classification 
(4) 
EMAE   0.717    
HOMD -0.349 0 0.597 - Leading 
LESD 0.281 -1 0.737 + Coincident 
ROBT -0.531 -1 0.765 - Lagging 
HURT -0.471 -1 0.826 - Lagging 
 
(1)Number of lag with highest cross-correlation between common parts of series 
(2)Ratio Common Component Variance over series variance 
(3)(+) and (-)  indicates the crime common component is in phase and in opposite phase  respectively with respect to the 
common component of the EMAE 
(4) Mean Delay Classification 
 
V.II Provincial Level 
 
At provincial level we only have crimes classified into crimes against person and property 
crimes, so we can only build a bivariate and 3-variate model. As we explained in section IV, 
we use an economic coincident indicator index ISAP.  We present the results in Table 11 and 
Table 12  
 
Bivariate Model: Total Crime and ISAP 
We first specify a DFM with n=2, and we set the minimum explained variance at 50%. In this 
way, the number of factors chosen is 1.  
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Table 11: Analysis of the Common Parts of Total Crime and ISAP. Bivariate Model 
 
Province Abrev(1) RCCV(2) Phase classification(3) Classification
(4)
 
  ACT-INDEX DEL-TOT   
Buenos Aires BUA 0.743 0.550 - Lagging 
Catamarca CAT 0.789 0.740 - Lagging 
Chaco  CHA 0.774 0.716 - Lagging 
Chubut CHU 0.814 0.623 + Leading 
Ciudad Autónoma CAB 0.785 0.694 - Lagging 
Córdoba CBA 0.796 0.577 - Lagging 
Corrientes COR 0.796 0.747 - Lagging 
Entre Ríos ERS 0.804 0.590 + Coincident 
Formosa FOR 0.800 0.597 - Leading 
Jujuy JUJ 0.777 0.602 + Coincident 
La Pampa LPP 0.770 0.719 - Lagging 
La Rioja LRJ 0.713 0.662 + Coincident 
Mendoza MEN 0.809 0.638 - Lagging 
Misiones MIS 0.791 0.617 - Leading 
Neuquén NEU 0.776 0.777 - Lagging 
Río Negro RNG 0.799 0.611 + Lagging 
Salta SAL 0.775 0.514 - Leading 
San Juan SJU 0.816 0.676 - Lagging 
San Luis SLU 0.783 0.698 + Coincident 
Santa Cruz SCZ 0.796 0.659 - Leading 
Santa Fe SFE 0.791 0.616 - Lagging 
Santiago del Estero SGO 0.807 0.621 + Lagging 
Tierra del Fuego TDF 0.793 0.674 - Lagging 
Tucumán TUC 0.794 0.718 - Lagging 
Argentina (ISAP) ARG 0.787 0.746 - Lagging 
Argentina (EMAE) ARG 0.626 0.745 - Lagging 
(1) Provinces identification  
(2) Ratio Common Component Variance over series variance 
(3) (+) and (-) indicate the crime common component is in phase and in opposite phase respectively with respect to the 
common component of the ISAP (provinces) or EMAE (National). 
(4) Mean Delay Classification 
 
According to Table 11, most provinces are counter cyclical (17 out of 24) that include the 
most representative provinces measured by their GDP (City and Province of Buenos Aires, 
Santa Fe, Córdoba, Mendoza and Tucumán). These results are consistent with the ones 
found at national level (see Table 5). The others 7 provinces are pro cyclical.  
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We also find that total crime in 15 out of 24 provinces are lagged related to the reference 
cycle, similar to the results obtained at national level. On the other hand, total crime in the 
rest of the provinces is coincident (4) and leading (5). 
In most of the provinces the motivation effect hold, meaning that during recessions, 
individuals increase their crime participation. 
 
 
Model 3-variate: Crime against persons, Property Crime and ISAP 
 
Next we repeat the analysis performed in the previous section but with the two groups of 
crime considered: crimes against persons and property crimes rates.  
We specify a DFM with n=3, and by setting the minimum explained variance at 50% we 
choose the number of factors, equal to 1.  
Table 12 shows that in most of the provinces (20 out of 24), property crime is counter cyclical 
and in the rest of the provinces pro cyclical (Chubut, Jujuy, La Rioja and San Luis). This 
needs further investigation, since it might be due to the data or to the behavior of property 
crime in these provinces. 
Additionally, property crime in 13 provinces is lagged related to the reference cycle just as it 
happened at national level, in two provinces is coincident and in the rest of them is leading 
(9). 
On the other hand, crimes against persons in 16 out of 24 provinces is pro cyclical, while in 
the other 8 is counter cyclical. For this type of crime, 11 provinces are lagged, 7 coincident 
and 6 are leading related to the reference cycle. At national level crimes against persons is a 
coincident series. 
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Table 12: Analysis of the Common Parts of Crime and business cycle by province. 3-variate Model 
 
Province Abrev
(1)
 
 
RCCV(2) Phase Classif.(3) Classification(4) 
  ACT-INDEX DCPRO DCPER DCPRO DCPER DCPRO DCPER 
Buenos Aires BUA 0.626 0.439 0.444 - - Lagging Leading 
Catamarca CAT 0.741 0.497 0.356 - - Leading Lagging 
Chaco  CHA 0.749 0.418 0.389 - + Lagging Leading 
Chubut CHU 0.781 0.486 0.383 + + Leading Leading 
Ciudad Autónoma CAB 0.742 0.590 0.528 - - Lagging Lagging 
Córdoba CBA 0.736 0.462 0.399 - + Lagging Lagging 
Corrientes COR 0.747 0.572 0.328 - + Lagging Lagging 
Entre Ríos ERS 0.751 0.135 0.653 - + Leading Coincident 
Formosa FOR 0.770 0.401 0.396 - + Leading Coincident 
Jujuy JUJ 0.397 0.786 0.794 + + Coincident Coincident 
La Pampa LPP 0.696 0.575 0.456 - - Lagging Lagging 
La Rioja LRJ 0.764 0.217 0.585 + - Lagging Leading 
Mendoza MEN 0.736 0.520 0.286 - + Lagging Coincident 
Misiones MIS 0.738 0.425 0.397 - + Leading Coincident 
Neuquén NEU 0.780 0.846 0.300 - + Lagging Lagging 
Río Negro RNG 0.773 0.392 0.549 - + Leading Lagging 
Salta SAL 0.664 0.430 0.443 - + Leading Lagging 
San Juan SJU 0.777 0.565 0.360 - + Lagging Coincident 
San Luis SLU 0.755 0.478 0.299 + + Coincident Coincident 
Santa Cruz SCZ 0.794 0.545 0.317 - + Leading Leading 
Santa Fe SFE 0.773 0.357 0.400 - - Lagging Leading 
Sant. del Estero SGO 0.792 0.444 0.565 - + Leading Lagging 
Tierra del Fuego TDF 0.753 0.448 0.526 - - Lagging Lagging 
Tucumán TUC 0.735 0.451 0.586 - - Lagging Lagging 
Argentina (ISAP) ARG 0.727 0.611 0.370 - + Lagging Coincident 
Argentina (EMAE) ARG 0.551 0.442 0.603 - + Lagging Coincident 
(1) Provinces identification (2) Ratio Common Component Variance over series variance (3) (+) and (-)  indicates the crime common component is in phase and in opposite phase  respectively with 
respect to the common component of the ISAP (provinces) or EMAE (National) (4) Mean Delay Classification 
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V. Conclusions 
 
This paper studied the relationship between crime and its typologies and business 
cycle in Argentina at national and provincial level using monthly time series for the 
period 1999-2008. The purpose of this paper was to determine common factors among 
crime rate and its typologies and the economic activity. We do no aim at determining a 
causal effect relationship. 
For that end we examined the presence of common factors (interpreted as cyclical 
components) driving the dynamics of a set of types of crimes and EMAE at national 
level and ISAP at provincial level. By means of Dynamic Factor Models (DFM) we 
identified which type of crime is related to business cycle and if these crimes are 
leading, lagging or coincident using mean factor classification. 
At national level, we found that crimes against persons are pro-cyclical and coincident, 
while property crimes are counter-cyclical and slightly lagged. 
We additionally analyzed four typologies of crime. Theft and Robberies, which belong 
to property crime group, are counter-cyclical and slightly lagging. In property crimes the 
classification of series by mean delay or by the highest lag correlation gives the same 
result. 
Murders and Intentional Injury belongs to crimes against person’s category, we find 
that murders are counter-cyclical and coincident or leading, depending on the method 
we use: highest lag correlation or mean delay classification respectively. Intentional 
injury is pro-cyclical and lagging or coincident depending again on which method of 
classification we use. 
At provincial level we only have total, property crimes and crime against persons. In 
general, most of the provinces performed equally to the national level for that type of 
crimes. However the behavior of all the provinces is not homogeneous. Those 
provinces that behave differently than the average are mostly those that have a small 
participation in the Argentinean GDP. 
These results are in line with those obtained by Detotto and Otranto (2011) who also 
find that most of the crimes are counter cyclical and lagging. 
As we pointed out at the beginning, the relationship between economic activity and the 
crime rate is controversial: An economic expansion could reduce criminal activities but 
it could also make illegal activities more attractive since it presents better opportunities. 
As discussed in Cantor and Land (1985) there are two different types of effect: 
motivation effect and opportunity effect. The first one describes a counter-cyclical 
behavior while the second one works in the opposite phase. We find, as Cantor and 
Land did, that property crimes can be more affected by motivation effect which implies 
a negative correlation with the economic fluctuations. Even more, property crimes are 
counter-cyclical, while crimes against persons are not as sensitive to economic 
variations. 
As a future agenda we will intent to update our dataset. However we are aware that it 
will not be an easy task, due to the central administration policy related to statistics.
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VIII Appendix  
 
Figure 1A: Boxplots: summary statistics at provincial level. Total crime rates 
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Figure 2A Total Crime by province and ISAP. Cycles (CY) 
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